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Appellee's Statement of the Case 
This case comes from the trial court on an appeal from a directed verdict. After the 
parties closed their evidence on the issue of liability, the court heard and granted a motion 
for directed verdict from the defense. Ms. Ottens had alleged that Dan McNeil was directly 
and vicariously liable for causing an accident that occurred after a chair owned by Mr. 
McNeil fell from a pick-up being driven by his son Jake. In her pleadings Ms. Ottens had 
claimed that Dan had employed his son Jake, and that Dan had also improperly loaded and 
or secured the chair. 
As will be shown by citation to the record in the body of this brief, all of the evidence 
presented at trial showed that on the day of the move Jake was employed by D&K Finish 
Carpentry, Inc., (D&K), paid by D&K, and was engaged in moving D&K's office and 
equipment from a residence in Bluffdale to Union Park. Some personal items belonging to 
Dan McNeil were also being moved. There was also some equivocal testimony that Dan 
McNeil had given Jake some money for gas. 
After hearing argument from both parties, the trial court noted that the overwhelming 
evidence showed that Jake was employed by D&K at the time of the accident. It also stated 
that there had been no evidence that Dan had employed his son. The court therefore directed 
a verdict in favor of the defense on vicarious liability. 
A directed verdict was also granted on the direct negligence claims. There had been 
no evidence presented at trial that Dan, rather than any one of the other 6 people on site, 
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loaded the chair or secured it in Jake's vehicle. There was no evidence that he inspected the 
vehicle before it left. All that Plaintiff was able to show was that Dan had helped tie some 
ropes to the eye hooks on the pick up. The court found that there was no evidence to tie Dan 
to the chair or to allege he inspected the vehicles. It also held that under Utah law, the driver 
has the ultimate duty to inspect and ensure that a load is safely secured. 
Ms. Ottens complained that the evidence of Jake's employment by D&K was an 
improper affirmative defense, and moved after the close of evidence to name D&K as a 
party, and to allege an action to pierce the corporate veil. The court denied the motion 
because of its untimeliness, its high potential for prejudice, and because it violated 
procedural due process. 
Ms. Ottens has also sought review of the trial court's decision to deny her the 
opportunity to amend her complaint to name Jake McNeil as a party. The court had declined 
to permit the amendment because it was first proposed more than four years after the 
accident, and therefore would have been subject to an immediate dismissal on the grounds 
of the statute of limitations. 
Finally, Ms. Ottens has sought review of certain evidentiary rulings made by the court. 
In particular, Ms. Ottens complains that the trial court erred when it refused to admit the 
investigative report, in an effort to show that Dan was the actual driver of the vehicle. The 
court allowed Ms. Ottens to question Mr. McNeil on the matter, but held that Ms. Ottens' 
complaint did not allege that Dan was the driver and this amounted to an effort to change the 
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pleadings and theory of the case at the last minute. The court also found the document to be 
of problematic origin, and internally inconsistent. 
Appellee's Statement of Issues of Appeal 
1. Did the court err in directing a verdict for Dan McNeil on the claim for respondeat 
superior when all of the evidence showed that Jake McNeil was employed by, and engaged 
in the work of, D&K when the accident occurred, and where there was no evidence that he 
was employed or paid by Dan McNeil, as the plaintiff alleged in her complaint? Reviewed 
under a correctness standard. Ferguson v. Williams & Hunt, 2009 UT 49, f 19. 
2. Did the court err in directing a verdict for Dan McNeil on the direct negligence 
causes of action when there was no evidence to show that he placed, or attempted to secure, 
the chair into Jake's truck, and where the evidence shows that Jake, aged 23, was the sole 
driver of the vehicle, and where the evidence showed that Dan was under no duty to secure 
the chair? Reviewed under a correctness standard. Ferguson v. Williams & Hunt, 2009 UT 
49, If 19. 
3. Did the trial court err when it declined to allow Ms. Ottens to amend her complaint 
to add Jake McNeil as a party after the statute of limitations had run, when the facts show 
that there was no identity of interest between Jake and his father Dan, and when there was 
no evidence that Jake committed any wrongdoing sufficient to invoke equitable tolling? 
Motions to Amend should be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Sulzen v. 
Williams 977 P.2d 497 (Utah 1992). 
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4. Did the trial court err when it declined to allow Ms. Ottens to amend her complaint 
after the close of evidence to add D&K as a party to action, or to allege that there was an 
alter-ego relationship between Dan McNeil and D&K, or that Dan McNeil was driving the 
vehicle that dropped the chair on the highway? Motions to Amend should be reviewed under 
an abuse of discretion standard. Sulzen v. Williams 977 P.2d 497 (Utah 1992). 
5. Did the court err when it allowed Mr. McNeil to introduce evidence that D&K 
employed Jake? Did this constitute an affirmative defense that must be set out in the 
pleadings under Rule 8 or Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure! Interpretation of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Pete v. 
Youngblood2006 UT App 303. ^  7, 141 P.3d 629. 
6. Did the court err in denying Ms. Ottens request to enter the accident report into 
evidence as a means of showing that Dan McNeil was the driver of the pick-up, although she 
had not made that claim in the pleadings? This is reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard. Daniels v Gamma West Br achy therapy, LLC, 2009 UT 66 f^ 58. 
7. Did the court err in allowing counsel to inquire when Ms. Ottens first retained 
counsel, when Ms. Ottens claimed she was unduly prejudiced by misinformation in the police 
report? Evidentiary Rulings are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Daniels v. 
Gamma West Br achy therapy, LLC, 2009 UT 66 \ 58. 
Statutes, Constitutional Provisions, Ordinances and Rules 
See, Addendum 4. 
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Summary of Appellee's Arguments 
1. The trial court properly granted a directed verdict in this case. Ms. Ottens produced 
no evidence to show that Jake McNeil, who was driving the vehicle that dropped the chair 
at issue, was employed and paid by Dan McNeil as was alleged in the complaint. All 
evidence showed that Jake was employed by, paid by, and carrying out duties for D&K. 
Testimony that Jake may have received gas money and carried some items belonging to Dan 
McNeil did not establish a direct employment relationship. The trial court was also correct 
in directing the verdict on the claims for direct negligence. There was no evidence that Dan, 
rather than any other of the six persons on site, loaded or secured the chair into Jake's truck. 
The jury would have been required to speculate or assume to find negligence on the part of 
Dan McNeil. 
2. The trial court properly denied the motion to add Jake McNeil as a party. The 
statute of limitations had run by the time the motion was made. Jake and Dan do not share 
an identity of interest, and there was no evidence of wrongdoing that would allow equitable 
tolling. The amendment would have been futile, and therefore the court did not abuse its 
discretion when it denied the motion. 
3. The trial court properly denied the motions to amend to add D&K and to allege 
that Dan McNeil was liable as the driver of the truck or under an alter ego theory. These 
motions were not made until after the close of evidence. The motions were untimely, ex 
prejudicial, and would have violated D&K's due process rights to procedural regularity. 
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4. The trial court did not err when it allowed the introduction of evidence that Jake 
McNeil was employed by and working for D&K when transporting the chair at issue in this 
case. This information had been supplied to Ms. Ottens from the outset of the litigation. 
Additionally, the evidence did not constitute an affirmative defense; it was not an avoidance, 
but rather directly contradicted Ms. Ottens' allegations that Dan McNeil personally employed 
and paid his son to transport personal goods from one residence to the other. Dan was under 
no obligation to designate D&K under Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as he 
was not seeking to allocate fault to D&K. Dan had designated Jake McNeil from the outset 
of the case. 
5. The trial court did not err in declining to admit the investigative report into 
evidence to show that Dan McNeil was driving the truck from which the chair fell. There was 
inadequate foundation for the report, it was internally inconsistent, and it contained three 
different types of handwriting. Ms, Ottens was not able to show that Mr. McNeil filled in 
the report. Additionally, Ms. Ottens had amended her complaint during the course of 
litigation and abandoned the claim that Dan was the driver of the vehicle in favor of a 
respondent superior cause of action. This amendment was done after questioning the 
investigating officer about the report. The report was not relevant to the case pleaded. 
6. The court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed Mr. McNeil to question Ms. 
Ottens about when she retained counsel. The facts were in evidence through her medical 
records. Additionally it was relevant to her claims of prejudice, and may have been relevant 
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to show that counsel directed treatment. This may have been relevant to the reasonableness 
of her treatment. 
Argument 
I) The trial court properly granted a directed verdict. Ms. Ottens produced no 
evidence that would support her claim that Jake McNeil was employed by the 
Defendant Dan McNeil. And she produced no evidence that would support imposing 
a duty of due care on Dan McNeil or that would support a finding that he acted 
negligently. 
In her second amended complaint against Dan McNeil, Ms. Ottens identified two 
potential grounds of liability. First, she alleged that he had employed and paid his son, Jake 
McNeil, to transport his personal property, and was therefore vicariously liable for Jake's 
negligence in allowing a chair to escape from the back of Jake's truck. Second, she asserted 
that Dan breached his duty of due care by improperly loading and securing the chair in Jake's 
vehicle, and was therefore liable for the injuries she suffered when the chair came loose on 
the highway. (Record 429-434) 
On the fourth day of trial, after Ms. Ottens' counsel acknowledged that his evidence 
on the issues of liability had been fully presented, the court entertained a motion for a 
directed verdict made by defense counsel. After lengthy argument, and close consultation of 
the record, the motion was granted. (Record 1014 pp. 81-85) In doing so, the court stated 
that there was overwhelming evidence that Jake McNeil had been employed by D&K, that 
there was no evidence to support that Jake was employed by Dan McNeil; that there was no 
evidence that Mr. Dan McNeil had undertaken any affirmative act that would have given rise 
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to a duty requiring him to ensure that the load placed in Jake's truck was secure, and that 
there was no evidence that Dan McNeil was responsible for loading the chair at issue in this 
case. (Record 984-985, 1014 pp. 81-85,) 
A directed verdict is proper if "after examining all evidence in a light most favorable 
to the nonmoving party, there is no competent evidence that would support a verdict in the 
nonmoving party's favor." Ferguson v. Williams & Hunt, 2009 UT 49, ^ f 19 (quoting Daines 
v. Vincent 2008 UT 51, f 20, 190 P.3d 1269.) When applying that standard, it is also 
essential to recognize that if a jury would be required to base its decision about the presence 
or absence of an essential element of a claim on mere speculation or conjecture, the trial 
court should direct a verdict in favor of the defendant. Walker v. Parish Chemical Company, 
914 P.2d 1157, 1163 (Utah. App. 1996). 
As will be shown more completely below, when the factual record in this case is 
carefully scrutinized, and the standards set out in Ferguson and Walker are applied to those 
facts, it becomes readily apparent that the trial court correctly granted the defendant's 
motion. There is no competent evidence that Jake McNeil was working for his father on the 
day the accident underlying this case occurred. Accordingly, there was no basis for to allow 
the question of vicarious liability to go to the jury. Additionally, there was no evidence that 
Dan McNeil was the individual who loaded the chair into Jake's pick-up, or that the chair 
came loose from the vehicle as a result of Dan's actions or omissions. 
Based on these facts, the court properly concluded that Ms. Ottens failed to produce 
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sufficient evidence to present the matter to the jury, as she failed to establish that Mr. McNeil 
owed her a duty of due care or that he breached any duty he could have voluntarily undertake 
in any way1. Since two essential elements of a cause of action for negligence were missing, 
the directed verdict was appropriate. 
1.) There was no evidence presented at trial that would support a finding that 
Jake McNeil was employed by his father, Dan McNeil, The court properly directed a 
verdict on the claim for vicarious liability. 
One of Ms. Ottens' primary bases for asserting that Dan McNeil is responsible for the 
injuries she allegedly suffered is that on the day and time in question, Jake McNeil was 
working for, and being paid by, Dan McNeil to help move his personal property from his 
former rental home in Bluffdale, Utah. Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint ^ f 14 (Record 
431 -432.) Thus, according to the appellant, Mr. McNeil was vicariously liable for the actions 
of his son. (Record 431-432.) At the time of trial, however, there were simply no facts 
elicited from the witnesses that supported this allegation. All of the testimony showed that 
Jake was employed by D&K, a company owned by his father and stepmother, that he was 
being paid by D&K on the day of the move, that other D&K employees were on site helping, 
and that the items moved on that day largely belonged to D&K, and were used in the 
business. In short, all of the evidence pointed to the conclusion that Jake was employed by 
1
 To prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish four essential 
elements: (1) that the defendant owed plaintiff a duty, (2) that the defendant breached that 
duty, (3) that the breach of duty was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury, and (4) 
that the plaintiff in fact suffered injuries or damages. Asael Farr & Sons Co. v. Truck Ins. 
Exchange, 2008 UT App 315, ffif 28-29, 193 P.3d 650, 
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D&K at the time of the move, and that the move itself was a corporate activity. A careful 
review of the testimony unambiguously proves this point. 
When Ms. Ottens called Jake McNeil to the stand, her very first questions were 
whether Jake was related to Dan McNeil, and whether he had ever worked for him. (Record 
1010 p.3:13-16) The response was unequivocal; Jake testified that he had been employed by 
D&K. (Record 1010 p.3:17) Upon further examination by Ms. Ottens' counsel he stated 
that he received payroll from D&K (Record 1010 p. 4:24), that he was a finish carpenter by 
trade (Record 1010 p.5:14), and that at the time of the accident D&K would obtain work and 
he and other employees would go out and do the jobs it obtained. (Record 1010 p.5:22-23) 
He also testified that maintenance and gas for the truck he used in the business, which he was 
purchasing, was occasionally subsidized by D&K. (Record 1010 p.7:1-4.) 
More importantly, all of the testimony elicited from Jake by Ms. Ottens shows that 
on the day of the accident, three or four employees of D&K, including Jake, were moving 
the company's office and carpentry equipment2 from one local ion to another. (Record 1010 
pp. 10:16-21, 25:1-2) The property included filing cabinets, boxes, a large wooden desk, 
shapers, chop saws, table saws and other carpentry equipment. (Record 1010 pp. 5:25, 6:1, 
8:16-20,22:23-25,23:1-5). Furthermore, Jake testified that he and the other employees who 
were involved in the move were paid by D&K, as part of their ordinary wages. (Record 1010 
2
 A table and chairs belonging to Dan McNeil were also put in Jake's truck. It was 
one of those chairs that came loose. 
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p.l9:l-12) 
Dan McNeil confirmed his son's recollection. He testified that the vast majority of 
items being moved on that day belonged to, and were used in, the business he owned with 
his ex-wife. As Jake had done, Dan identified the work tools as a large part of the move, but 
also testified that there were three filing cabinets, a desk, a computer, a copy machine, a fax 
machine, a printer, rolls of pending projects, and office chairs being transported on that day. 
(Record 1012 p.37:15-25,38:4-12) And, while Dan acknowledged that some personal items 
were also taken, he explained that he and Kim3 had actually been divorced since 1998, and 
that he had moved most of his personal items out of the home when that became final. 
(Record 1012 p. 36:8-15) He had, however, kept his office in his former home. (Record 
1012 p. 37:1) 
In sum, the evidence elicited at trial was as follows: (1) On the day of the move Jake 
was employed and paid by D&K Finish Carpentry; (2) Jake and other company employees, 
were carrying out a corporate activity in moving D&K's business and office equipment from 
one location to the other, and (3) While some of Dan's personal belongings may have been 
moved4, the primary purpose of the activity was to move the property necessary to carry on 
the business of D&K. Ms. Ottens' assertion that including one or two personal items in the 
move changes it into a personal errand, and thereby makes Jake Dan's employee, rather than 
3
 Kim McNeil was the K of D&K. 
4
 The only items specifically identified were a kitchen table and chairs. 
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D&K's, simply does not stand up to scrutiny5. Indeed, Ms. Ottens' characterization of this 
as a hasty move necessitated by a divorce, with the implication that it was therefore primarily 
personal in nature, is belied by the facts. The personal part of the move had long been 
completed. The business purpose remained. 
Since all evidence pointed to the fact that Jake was employed by D&K, and not by 
Dan personally, and that Jake was fulfilling a corporate purpose at the time of the accident, 
the trial court was correct in directing a verdict on the claim of vicarious liability. 
(ii.) The fact that Jake was moving a table and chair belonging to Dan McNeil would 
not support a claim of vicarious liability. 
Briefly, it is important to note that in addition to the voluminous evidence relating to 
D&K's employment of Jake, the court also paused to point out that Ms. Ottens had simply 
failed to produce any evidence that Dan had employed Jake or that an agency relationship 
existed between the two. (Record 1014 p. 19:13-18.) As the court noted, the only evidence 
relating to the claim that Dan personally employed Jake is that Dan stated that he may have 
given Jake some gas money for the move6. It also noted that it may be fair to assume that 
5
 The court noted that the litigated and tested evidence construed most favorably 
to Ms. Ottens' position would be that Jake was paid by the corporation in the ordinary 
course of business and was doing things for the corporation when the move occurred, and 
incidentally helping out his father at the same time. (Record 1014 p. 22:3-7). 
6
 The precise testimony was that during his deposition, Mr. McNeil stated that he did not 
recall paying anyone for the move, but he may have given them gas money. (Addendum 2 p. 
9:13). When asked about Jake's deposition testimony that he received his regular paycheck, Mr. 
McNeil stated that he would trust Jake's memory over his own, and that Jake was probably more 
accurate. (Addendum 2 p. 35:1-17; see also, Record 1012 p.9:15-19, where Mr. McNeil testified 
that he told Ms. Ottens' counsel that he gave Jake gas money.) 
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Jake may have been doing Dan a favor in moving some of his personal items along with the 
D&K property. (Rec. 1014 19:16-18). 
Frankly, under established Utah law this type of activity would not be sufficient to 
establish an employment or agency relationship. This state has long rejected the family 
purpose doctrine, Conklin v. Walsh 193 P.2d 437, 440 (Utah 1948), and therefore the mere 
fact that Jake was helping his father move some personal items would not be sufficient to 
establish an employment or agency relationship. Indeed in one of the earliest Utah cases to 
discuss the parameters of vicarious liability for the operation of a motor vehicle, the Utah 
Supreme Court made clear that where family relationships are concerned, agency (and 
therefore vicarious liability) cannot be established by looking at the ultimate purpose or 
object of the trip. Rather, the court stated, the question that must be answered is whether the 
purported principal had the right to control the agent during the trip. Fox v. Lavender 56 
P.2d 1049, 1052 (Utah 1936). If not, then there was no agency in the operation of the 
vehicle, and vicarious liability would not be present. 
The example provided by the court to illustrate this point is telling, especially in light 
of the facts present here. Justice Wolf pointed out that a husband may take his own car and 
do a favor for his wife, such as picking up a dress from the cleaners, and would be in a sense 
his wife's agent to procure the dress. But, unless the wife exerted control over her husband's 
operation of the vehicle, he would not be her agent for the operation of the automobile, and 
not vicariously liable for any accident. The court then noted that this would be so, even if the 
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defendant had given the person a little cash to get the dress. Id. 1052. Here, all of the 
evidence shows that Jake was driving his own vehicle at the time of the accident (Rec. 1010 
p. 6:20-22), and that he was fully in control of that vehicle, and operating without instruction 
or supervision from Dan.(Rec. 1010 pp.25-29) Thus, even if the overwhelming evidence 
about his employment by D&K is simply ignored, under the analysis contained in Fox v. 
Lavender there is still no evidence that Jake was employed by or acting as the agent of Dan 
McNeil. The trial court rightfully rioted the absence of evidence to show 
employment/agency, and therefore properly dismissed the claim for vicarious liability. 
2.) The trial court properly found that there was no evidence to support a finding 
that Dan McNeil owed a duty to ensure that the chair at issue in this case was properly 
secured. 
When granting the directed verdict on the issue of direct negligence, the trial court 
also looked at the question of whether Dan McNeil had a duty to ensure that Jake's vehicle 
was properly loaded and secured before Jake left the Bluffdale property. This question is 
essential, because without a duty a party may not be held negligent as a matter of law. See, 
AsaelFarr & Sons Co. v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 2008 UT App 315, ffif 28-29, 193 P.3d 650, 
in which the Court of Appeals noted that establishing the existence of a duty is the first 
element in establishing a negligence claim. In this case, the trial court noted that based on 
existing law, and based on the facts developed as the case was tried, it could not find that 
Dan McNeil was under any legal obligation to ensure that Jake's vehicle was appropriately 
secured before leaving the property. (Rec. 1014 pp. 81-85) It did so by making reference 
14 
both to the statutory obligations imposed upon drivers of vehicles, and by looking at the facts 
that were specific to the case. 
Utah Code Ann., 72-7-409(6) states: 
"A person many not operate a vehicle with a load on any highway unless the load 
and any load covering is fastened, secured, and confined to prevent the covering 
or load from becoming loose, detached, or in any manner a hazard to the safe 
operation of the vehicle, or to other highway users." 
This statute is essential to the proper resolution of this case, because it clearly indicates that 
our legislature, after due consideration, determined that it was the operator of the vehicle who 
has the duty to ensure that any load contained in the vehicle is properly confined and tied 
down. This makes sense, because it is, after all, the operator who must make the final 
decision about whether to move the vehicle onto a roadway, and it is his or her sole 
obligation to make decisions about the safety of the vehicle before he enters the roadway. 
A recent case out of Appellate Court of the State of Washington shows why duties 
such as this may not properly be delegated to others. In Ganno v. Langano Corporation, 80 
P.3d 180, 184 119 Wash. App. 310, (Wash.App. 2d 2004), the court was confronted with a 
claim that a lumberyard had failed to properly secure an I beam in the rear of the plaintiffs 
pickup. When the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the beam coming loose from its 
moorings, he alleged that this was evidence of fault on the part of the lumberyard. The Court 
disagreed, pointing out that the Washington statute, which was very similar to ours7, made 
7
 The Court noted that RCW 46.61.655(1) stated that "No vehicle could be driven 
or moved on any public highway unless such vehicle is so constructed or loaded as to 
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the driver ultimately responsible for ensuring the security of his vehicle. Id., 184. Thus, even 
if the lumberyard had undertaken to secure the load, it could not be negligent, as a matter 
of law, because it was the driver who "drove the truck on a public highway without first 
ascertaining that his load would not escape." Id, 184. While this is a case of first 
impression in Utah, the statutory schemes are very similar, and the reasoning is sound. It is 
the driver who determines to take the vehicle onto the roadway, and it is driver's ultimate 
responsibility to make sure the load is secure before making that decision. To allow blame 
to be shifted to someone other than the drive would allow operators to skirt responsibility for 
an activity fully under their control, i.e., a final inspection of the vehicle before leaving. 
It is necessary to recognize that the trial court also found that there was no evidence 
that Dan had voluntarily undertaken any efforts to supervise the loading of the vehicle or to 
secure the chair at issue, which, in its opinion, could potentially give rise to a duty. (Rec. 
986, 1014 p. 73:20-23.) And this finding was clearly supported by the record. Both Dan and 
Jake testified that for most of the day in question, Dan remained in the home, deciding what 
should be taken away. (Rec. 1010 p. 24:8-14. 1012 p. 8:23-25) Dan further testified that he 
did not inspect any of the vehicles before they left (Rec. 1012 p.9:4), and Jake stated that 
when he decided to drive away his father was in the house with his ex-wife Kim. (Rec. 1010 
p. 24:7). 
prevent any of its load from dropping shifting, leaking, or otherwise escaping therefrom." 
Id, 184. 
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In granting a directed verdict, and finding that Dan McNeil was under no duty of care, 
the court took note of all of this evidence, and compared it with what Ms. Ottens' offered 
as proof of an affirmative act on Dan's part. She was able to point to only a single bit of 
testimony, indicating that while Mr. McNeil did not inspect the loads to see if they were 
secure, he had participated in "throwing some ropes" back and forth across two of the trucks. 
(Rec. 1012 p. 9:14-14) Clearly, this one act would not support the existence of a duty, 
because the testimony itself is so vague, and there was no follow-up. There is no indication 
when the event occurred, what stage the packing was in, what had gone on before, or what 
went on after. Similarly, there is no mention of attempting to secure the chair that came 
loose. Simply stated, there were no facts that were sufficient to show that Dan had 
undertaken any acts that would give rise to a duty that did not exist otherwise. The trial court 
made the proper decision to direct the verdict because there was no duty of due care owed 
by Mr. McNeil. 
3.) There was no evidence that Dan McNeil improperly loaded or secured the 
chair at issue. 
Finally, Ms. Ottens argues that the recent case of Magana v. Dave Roth Construction, 
2009 UT 45, 215 P.3d 143 has created new law that should cause this court to reassess Mr. 
McNeil's liability for the injuries she suffered. A closer look at Magana, however, shows 
that the case is both legally and factually inapposite to the facts presented at trial. 
First, this court should note that Magana was primarily concerned with the application 
and limits of the "retained control doctrine", a general rule that recognizes that "one who 
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hires an independent contractor and does not participate or control the manner in which the 
... work is performed owes no duty of care ...." Id, % 22. Here, the defendant did not assert 
that Jake or the other D&K employees were independent contractors; rather, he asserted that 
they were employed by someone other than him (personally). Thus, the entire discussion of 
retained control is irrelevant. 
Second, the fact that the Supreme Court found that a general contractor may still have 
some liability for negligence, if he actively participated in the acts that caused the injury 
complained of, does not break new grounds. As will be discussed in greater detail below, 
Utah law has always held that an individual acting for or on behalf of a corporate entity may 
be held liable for his own acts of negligence. See, Armed Forces Insurance Exchange v. 
Harrison 2003 UT 14, ffif 19, 21, 70 P.3d 35. 
Third, and most important, however, a careful review of the Magana decision shows 
why Mr. McNeil may not be held liable under the facts disclosed during trial. In Magana the 
case for direct liability - as opposed to vicarious liability that is immunized by the retained 
control doctrine - was based upon the fact that the defendant participated in the very act that 
caused Mr. Magana injury. As the case makes clear, liability was not predicated on the 
general obligation to oversee and supervise the safety of the job site, instead it was predicated 
on the fact that the defendant's foreman was seen actively involved in securing the very load 
of trusses that came loose and caused the plaintiff to suffer injuries. Id., f 37. 
This, of course, is very different from what occurred in this case. Here, unlike the 
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facts in Magana, no one was able to say who loaded the chair at issue (Rec. 1010 p.10:16-
20), and Jake identified at least six people that were involved in the process. (Rec. 1010 p. 
10:16-18). Similarly, there was no testimony about who individually secured the vehicle's 
load or looked over the contents. (Rec. 1010 p.23:23-25), though when Jake left the 
Bluffdale property Dan was inside the home. (Rec. 1010 p.24:7) The only testimony related 
to Dan was that he loaded some unspecified items and helped secure some ropes to the pick-
up. (Rec. 1012 p. 9:14-14) Thus, in order for a jury to have found Dan liable under a theory 
of direct negligence, it would first have had to determine that Dan loaded the chair into 
Jake's truck or that Dan undertook to secure the chair, and failed to do so. In the absence of 
evidence, the jury would have been required to either assume or speculate that this was the 
case. As set out above, this is impermissible. Walker v. Parish Chemical Company, 914 P.2d 
1157, 1163 (Utah. App. 1996). The trial court was correct in directing the verdict. 
II) The trial court properly denied the motion to amend the complaint to add 
Jake McNeil as a party to this lawsuit. The statute of limitations had run by the time 
that the motion was made. Jake had no identity of interest with Dan, and therefore the 
amendment would have been futile. 
Motions to amend pleadings are governed by Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The straightforward language of the rule states that a party must seek leave of 
the court to amend its complaint once a responsive pleading has been filed, and that the court 
should grant such requests liberally as justice requires. As set out in the motions and 
8
 Jake suspected that it was him or one of the other employees, because they were 
the "young strong muscle." (Rec. 1010 p. 11:2) 
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memoranda that were filed in the underlying case, however, there are limits to a trial court's 
liberality. And it is an undisputed axiom of law that justice does not require that a court grant 
a request to amend, if the new pleading is legally insufficient or futile. Jensen v. IHC 
Hospitals, Inc., 2003 UT 51, % 139, 82 P.3d 1076. Futility, in turn, has been defined to 
include those proposed pleadings that would be unable to withstand an immediate motion to 
dismiss. Id., f 139. 
This is precisely the case here. Ms. Ottens' proposed amended complaint, which was 
filed on September 5, 2006, acknowledged that the accident at issue occurred on March 29, 
2002. (Rec. 109-114). Thus, by the time she asked the court for permission to add Jake 
McNeil as a party, the four-year statute of limitation had already run. Utah Code Ann., §78-
12-25 (currently renumbered as §78B-2-307). This would have made the amended complaint 
vulnerable to a motion to dismiss. Doe v. Corp. of President of Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints, 2004 UT App 274 %6, 98 P.3d 429. 
Ms. Ottens herself acknowledged this difficulty in the motion and memoranda that she 
filed with the court. In those papers she recognized that unless she could provide a reason 
to ignore the statute of limitations, her attempt to add Jake McNeil would be untimely and, 
therefore, futile. In an effort to meet this challenge Ms. Ottens offered two potential grounds 
to excuse the late filing. First, she argued that under Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure the proposed amendment should relate back in time to the filing of the original 
complaint, because Dan and Jake McNeil shared an identity of interest. (Rec. 120-121) 
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Second, she asserted that because she was unaware that Jake was the driver of the vehicle, 
the discovery rule should apply to toll the statute of limitations. (Rec. 121 -122) As will be 
illustrated below, neither of these provides an adequate basis for ignoring the statute of 
limitations. Accordingly, the trial court was correct in denying the motion to amend to add 
Jake McNeil as a party, because such an amendment would be futile under the facts of this 
case. 
1. Jake and Dan did not share an identity of interest as defined by this Court 
because they did not share the same position or defenses in the litigation. 
Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure holds that when a claim asserted in 
an amended pleading arises out of the same transaction or course of events described in the 
original complaint, the amendment will relate back to the date of the original pleading. This 
rule also allows a party to cure defects in her pleadings despite the intervening running of an 
applicable statute of limitations. Russell v. Standard Corp. 898 P.2d 263, 265 (Utah 1995). 
However, it is well established that Rule 15(c) does not generally apply in cases in which the 
plaintiff seeks to add a new party to the suit, as this would completely undermine the purpose 
of statutes of limitation. Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214, 217 (Utah 
1984). 
Naturally, the general rule has a narrow exception. If a plaintiff can demonstrate that 
the party to be added has an identity of interest with a previously named party, such that it 
can be assumed or proved that there would be no prejudice, then the amendment will relate 
back to the time the complaint was originally filed. Penrose v. Ross 2003 UT App 157 f^ 9, 
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71P.3d631. 
The initial question that must be confronted, then, is what does it mean to have an 
"identity of interest?" In Penrose this court answered the inquiry by holding that in the 
context of Rule 15(c) a "true identity of interest" requires that the parties have the "same" 
interests or posture toward the pending claim; i.e., the legal positions and defenses of the new 
and old parties must be the same. Id., Tflf 15-17. 
In showing how this standard should be applied, this Court engaged in an extended 
discussion of Nunez v. Albo 2002 UT App 247, 53 P.3d 2, a case it had considered just before 
taking on Penrose. In Nunez the plaintiff sought to add the defendant's employer to the 
pending suit, after the statute of limitations had expired, and argued that under the unique 
circumstances of the case the two parties had the necessary identity of interest. It noted, for 
example, that the new party acknowledged the employee-employer relationship, that it 
admitted that the employee had been working within the course and scope of his 
employment, and that the employer had provided a defense for the employee from the outset 
of the case. Id., W 29-30. Thus, the disposition of the case against one party would 
necessarily affect the liability of the other, demonstrating that the existence of a true identity. 
Penrose at f^ 19. In contrast, the defendants in Penrose, a father and son, were determined 
not to have the requisite identity of interest. In reaching this decision, this court focused on 
the fact the defenses offered by the two were not congruent. The father's defense was simply 
that he was not the driver of the vehicle in question, and therefore was not responsible for 
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injuries resulting from its negligent operation. The son, however, was prepared to focus on 
the running of the statute of limitations. Thus, unlike the Nunez defendants, the father and 
son did not have the same posture toward the plaintiffs claims, did not share defenses, and 
the disposition against one would not necessarily affect the disposition against the other. Id., 
f 19. Accordingly, there was no identity of interest. 
Here, the underlying facts are more similar (indeed they are almost identical) to those 
in the Penrose case than they are to the facts in Nunez. As set out in the briefing that was 
filed in connection with the motion to amend, Dan McNeil's defenses to the allegations were 
that he was neither the driver of the vehicle at issue in the case, nor the employer of his son. 
(Rec. 65-74, and 124-136) Thus, he claimed that he had no direct or vicarious liability. For 
this reason an allocation of fault under Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was 
included in the answer.(Rec.65-74) In contrast, Jake's defense, like that of the son in 
Penrose, would have focused on the fact that the statutory period had run. Additionally, had 
the amendment been allowed, counsel for each of the two defendants would have been 
obligated to explore who loaded the chair onto the truck, and who attempted to secure it. 
Clearly, then, there was the potential for each party to point to the other as the culprit in 
causing the injuries complained of by Ms. Ottens9. Under Penrose there is no identity of 
interest in such circumstances. 
9
 This does not necessarily mean that the parties would not have shared some 
common postures or defenses. It does show, however, that they did not have a completely 
unified stance or approach to the pending litigation. 
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Without the identity of interest10, the complaint against Jake would not relate back to 
the time the initial complaint was filed. Since the proposed amendment would have been 
filed more than five months after the statute of limitations had run, it would have been 
subject to an immediate motion to dismiss. And, as set out above, justice does not require 
that a trial court permit an amendment, when the pleading would be legally futile. The trial 
court, therefore, made the appropriate decision in denying the motion to amend, and in no 
way abused its discretion. 
2. The equitable discovery rule does not apply in this case. It would have been 
improper to add Jake McNeil as a party after the limitations period had run. 
Much of Ms. Ottens' argument regarding the propriety of the court's decision to deny 
her request to add Jake McNeil to the suit after the limitations period had run centers on the 
claim that she was deceived or mislead by acts undertaken by Dan McNeil. Ms. Ottens 
asserts that absent that impropriety she would have been able to name Jake to the suit in a 
timely manner, and that the limitations period should be tolled under general principals of 
10
 Ms. Ottens makes a brief, and unconvincing, stab at asserting that this case 
could be analyzed as a misnomer case, which allows a party 1o correct technical defects in 
the pleadings. Penrose If 14. A misnomer occurs when a party misstates the name of a 
defendant, for example identifying a defendant as "Geneva Rock Co.," instead of 
"Geneva Rock Products". See, Wilcox v. Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367, 370-71 
(Utah 1986). It can also occur when the proper party is identified in the body of the 
complaint, but misidentified in the caption. Sidzen v. Williams, 1999 UT App 76, f^ 14, 
977 P.2d 497. Here there was no technical mistake. Ms. Ottens was not trying to 
substitute Jake for Dan, and thereby correct a mistake in her pleadings. She was trying to 
keep Dan in the suit, and add Jake. In Penrose, TJ 14 this Court stated that this was not a 
type of misnomer. 
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equity. This argument falters on two grounds. First, while the appellant has been quick to 
assume that Mr. McNeil committed some malfeasance, the evidence does not support that 
claim1 \ Second, the elements of equitable estoppel, which underlie the equitable discovery 
rule, are simply not present in this case. Accordingly, there was no reason to apply the rule 
in this case, and no reason to toll the statute of limitations. The trial court correctly declined 
to allow an amendment under those circumstances. 
(I.) The appellant has failed to demonstrate that Mr. Dan McNeil mislead her in any 
way or that he was responsible for the contents of the police report and its addenda. 
In assessing whether Ms. Ottens is entitled to invoke the equitable discovery rule, it 
is essential to understand that her claim is based almost entirely on the assumption that it was 
Mr. McNeil who filled out the Utah Highway Patrol Accident Information Form, which 
identified him, rather than Jake, as the driver of the Ford pick-up involved in this action. 
(Rec. 151-157) This, she claimed, was an affirmative misrepresentation on the defendant's 
part that caused her to pursue the wrong individual in the first instance. (Rec. 131-149) The 
record, however, does not bear out this contention. In fact, testimony given during the 
discovery process and at trial strongly contradicts the accuracy of Ms. Ottens' basic 
assumption. 
During the discovery period, Ms. Ottens deposed the investigating officer, Trooper 
11
 Nor does the evidence support the contention that she acted with reasonable 
diligence in moving her claim forward. 
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Lee, and asked about how he came to name Dan McNeil in the report. The questioning 
revealed that the officer did not know who had filled in the accident form, including the 
information identifying D&K Finish Carpentry and Dan McNeil. (Addendum 3, p. 15). He 
also testified that to the best of his recollection he got Mr. McNeil's name from a license 
plate (Addendum 3, p. 18), and that he could not remember whether he ever spoke with Mr. 
McNeil directly (Addendum 3, p. 18) Trooper Lee specifically stated that he did not know 
if Dan McNeil had filled in the information (Addendum 3, p. 19) or if, in fact, he had a phone 
conversation with Mr. McNeil himself. (Addendum 3, p. 28). Clearly, the investigating 
officer's testimony calls into doubt the reliability of the document relied upon by Ms. Ottens 
to establish "malfeasance" on the part of Mr. McNeil, and does nothing to show that Mr. 
McNeil made any misrepresentation. In fact, we have no information how the report was 
compiled. 
The testimony given at trial also undermines the assumption that Mr. McNeil told 
Trooper Lee that he was the driver of the vehicle. Counsel for Ms. Ottens aggressively 
questioned Mr. McNeil about the police report, but was unable to establish that the writing 
in the document was his. Under examination, Dan McNeil noted that there were at least 
three different types of handwriting in the report (Rec. 1012 p. 17:21-23), and that while 
some of them were similar to his own (Rec. 1012 p. 16:2, 17:4-6; 18:3-23) others were not 
(Rec. 1012p. 17:18-20,18:9-15). More significant, however, is the testimony that he did not 
recall filling out the form at issue, that he did not believe he had filled out the form, and that 
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he "definitely did not fill out that I was the driver of the vehicle." (Rec. 1012 p. 21:21-25, 
22:1.) 
Based on this evidence only one conclusion can be drawn. Ms. Ottens' assumption 
that Dan McNeil made a misrepresentation about who was driving the vehicle in question is 
not supported by any competent evidence. 
3. Jake McNeil cannot be made liable for the purported acts of Dan McNeil. The 
equitable tolling may not be applied to bring Jake into the lawsuit after the limitations 
period expired. 
Even if this court were to give credence to Ms. Ottens' unfounded speculation 
regarding the source of the misinformation contained on the official accident report, the 
equitable discovery rule would still not apply to allow an amendment in this case. As set out 
above, the exception created in Russell Packard Development v. Carson 2005 UT 14 f 26, 
108 P.3d 741 is based upon principals of equitable estoppel, which are designed to keep a 
party who has committed some malfeasance or wrongdoing from benefitting from that 
impropriety. With respect to a statute of limitations, our Supreme Court held that "a 
defendant who causes a delay in bringing a cause of action is estopped from relying on that 
statute of limitations as a defense to the action." Id ^26. 
Here, there is a very basic reason why this limited exception would not allow Ms. 
Ottens to amend her complaint and add Jake as a party after the limitations period had 
expired. Simply put, the appellant did not allege or prove that Jake played any part in 
providing inaccurate information to the investigating officer (or to the appellant); indeed 
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there is not a single fact anywhere in the record that even hints at such an occurrence. And 
it would be improper to attribute the purported acts of his father to the son. Because he did 
not cause any delay in bringing the action against himself, Jake was, and is, fully entitled to 
take refuge in the defense provided by the statute of limitations. Estoppel is inappropriate. 
4. Equity does not require that the discovery rule apply in this case. 
Finally, and briefly, this Court should also recognize that principles of equity, as 
applied to the facts in this case, do not compel the conclusion that Ms. Ottens should have 
been permitted to amend her complaint to add Jake McNeil. And they most certainly do not 
show that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her request. 
Ms. Ottens hired counsel to pursue recovery for the injuries she allegedly suffered in 
the underlying car accident within months of the accident. (Rec. 101 lpl39:9~l 1) She came 
to a swift settlement with Ms. Cindy Quast, the driver who actually collided with the vehicle 
that hit Ms. Ottens' truck. (Rec. 101 lp. 137:1-7) After this she simply waited for a number 
of years, and then approximately three years later she finally filed suit against Mr. McNeil 
and Mr. Coleman. (Rec. 1-7). 
It is also worth noting that before the statute of limitations had expired, Dan McNeil 
put Ms. Ottens on notice that Jake McNeil was the driver of the pick identified in the police 
report. The defendant answered his complaint within days of his counsel accepting service, 
and in that answer he stated that Jake was the likely driver of the Ford pick-up. (Rec. 63-64, 
65-74) While the appellant complains that this designation was somewhat equivocal, Mr. 
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McNeil did his best to provide information about an event that occurred almost four years 
earlier. The uncertainly arose because Mr. McNeil was unsure whether Jake or another 
individual was driving when the truck left his former residence. Both Dan and Jake testified 
that on the day of the move, Dan was primarily inside the home supervising the loading of 
boxes, and was not present when Jake departed. (Rec. 110:24:8-14, 1012 8:23-25) At any 
rate, while there were only a few days before the statute ran, Ms. Ottens was aware of two 
important facts. First, she knew that Dan was not the operator of the Ford pick-up. Second, 
she knew the name of the likely driver. Yet, armed with these facts, she did nothing. A 
motion to amend was not made for more than five months. (Rec. 115-116) Clearly, this is 
not a timely and prompt response, and it need not be rewarded. 
Finally, it is important to understand that the other issues raised by Ms. Ottens as 
evidence to justify her inaction are without merit. She complains that Mr. McNeil's insurer 
delayed in accepting service, but she fails to disclose that the delay was created in part by her 
own actions. When defense counsel became aware that Mr. McNeil's insurer did not know 
his location, it recognized that acceptance of service, which had been authorized by the 
insurer, could potentially compromise Mr. McNeil's rights. Counsel offered to accept service 
even though it did not know the whereabouts of Mr. McNeil, if Ms. Ottens would agree to 
cap any recovery to the limits of insurance. When that offer was turned down, however, 
there was no choice but to decline to accept12 service. (All of these facts are disclosed in 
12
 The discussions were conducted in a two week period after a copy of the 
complaint and acceptance was forwarded to defense counsel. (Rec.228,230). 
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correspondence attached to Appellants papers moving to amend. Rec. 228-230). Efforts 
were made to skip trace Mr. McNeil, however, and when they proved successful, 
arrangements were then made to accept service, and an answer was filed before the 
expiration of the twenty days. (Rec.230, 65-74). Thus, rather than showing delay, the facts 
reveal that Mr. McNeil acted with reasonable promptness, and disclosed the essential facts 
of the underlying accident in time for Ms. Ottens to name Jake as a defendant to the action. 
Her failure to do so should rest at her own feet. 
Ill) The Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the appellant's motion to 
amend its complaint to allege a cause of action against D&K Finish Carpentry, Inc., 
The motion to bring a new party into the case was made after the close of appellant's 
evidence on liability. 
On December 17, 2008, after acknowledging to the court that he had finished 
presenting his evidence on liability13, appellant's counsel moved to amend its complaint to 
add D&K Finish Carpentry, Inc., ("D&K") as a party to the action, and to set out a cause of 
action alleging that D&K was an alter-ego of Mr. McNeil, thereby allowing it to pierce the 
corporate veil. (Rec, 1013. 17:16-22, pp. 28:12-25,29:1-13). After hearing argument on the 
matter the following morning, the court declined to allow such an amendment, noting that 
the motion was untimely and posed a significant danger of prejudice to both Dan McNeil and 
13
 During a discussion that began with questions about jury instructions, the court 
stated that it anticipated motions to dismiss based on the evidence presented, and asked 
counsel if he had finished presenting evidence on the issue of liability. The parties 
stipulated that the evidence regarding liability was complete, and agreed to present 
argument on various motions, including that to amend the pleadings to name "D&K" as 
an additional party the following day. This stipulation was repeated the following day. 
(Rec. 1013, pp. 40:18-25, 41:1-17, 1013 p.1-3) 
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to D&K. (Rec. 1014 pp.56-58) In doing so, it stated that there was no identity of interest 
between D&K and Dan McNeill that could justify amending after the statute of limitations 
had run. The court also held that permitting such an amendment would violate the Due 
Process Clauses of both the United States Constitution and the Utah State Constitution. (Rec. 
984-987.) 
The appellant has characterized this ruling as a mistake of law on the part of the court, 
and has argued that it should therefore be reviewed under a "correctness" standard. (Brief of 
Appellant p. 2) This, however, is incorrect. Under well established case law, a denial of a 
motion to amend is reviewed under an "abuse of discretion" standard. Sulzen v. Williams 977 
P.2d 497 (Utah 1992) And, when this standard is applied to the facts on the record in this 
matter, it becomes evident that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. 
In fact, the court made the proper decision. 
1.) The motion was untimely and posed a significant opportunity for prejudice 
to Mr. McNeil and to D&K. 
Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party must seek leave 
of the court to amend its pleadings after a responsive pleading has been filed, and further 
states that the court should freely grant such permission "when justice so requires." This 
language has been interpreted to mean that the trial court should liberally allow amendments, 
however, this discretion is not without bounds. When an amendment is untimely, unjustified, 
or poses the risk of prejudice to the opposing party, the trial court, in its discretion, may 
properly deny such a motion. Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 2004 UT App 44, f 42, 87 
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P.3d 734. And, it is clear that if the court decides to deny a motion to amend, it need not 
find that all three conditions are satisfied. A denial may be justified on the basis of only one 
or two of these factors. Id.9 at ^  42. See also, Daniels v. Gamma West Br achy therapy, LLC, 
2009 UT 66 J^ 58. Here, after considerable argument, the trial court found that the motion 
to amend was untimely, and that it posed the potential of prejudice to the parties. (Rec. 1014 
p. 56-58) It therefore declined to allow the amendment. This decision is clearly supported 
by the relevant law and the facts on the record. 
In the recent case of Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 2004 UT App 44, 87 P.3d 
734, the Court of Appeals undertook a detailed analysis of the issue of timeliness, and stated 
that under established case law a proposed amendment is generally deemed to be untimely 
when it is made in the advanced procedural stages of the litigation. These would include 
motions made "after the close of discovery, upon the eve of trial, or after an order of 
dismissal had been entered." Id., f 58. Here, the appellant failed to offer her motion until 
after she had finished presenting evidence on the question of Mr. McNeil's liability, at a time 
when the trial was nearly complete. (Rec 1013 pp. 40:18-25, 41:1-17) Since the close of 
evidence is unquestionably later than the "close of discovery" or "the eve of trial", under the 
standard definition of the term, Ms. Ottens' motion was untimely14. 
14
 Parenthetically, the Court should recognize that there was no justification for 
waiting this long. Counsel for appellant knew of the existence of D&K from the 
inception of the litigation. The police report that appellant intended to introduce into 
evidence, and which appellant attached to numerous memoranda filed with the court, 
indicates that D&K was the registered owner of the vehicle. See, for example, the Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Amend, filed on September 26, 2006 
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Similarly, the court's finding of unavoidable prejudice is also well supported. Under 
Utah law a party is said to suffer unavoidable prejudice when the amendment would force 
it to litigate issues for which it had no time to prepare. GLFP Ltd. v. CL Management, Ltd., 
2007 UT App 131 ^ | 28, 163 P.3d 636. Here at least two parties would have been placed in 
this position had Ms. Ottens been allowed to amend her complaint for a third time, after the 
close of her case on liability. 
First, as argued during the hearing, D&K, had never hired an attorney, had never 
conducted discovery, and had never explored any defenses that it might have been available. 
(Rec. 1014 p. 49:17-23, p. 50:1:24) Clearly, the lack of representation and lack of discovery 
would have placed it at a disadvantage in defending the allegations of wrongdoing. Second, 
since Ms. Ottens seems to want to amend her complaint not only to add D&K, but to add a 
cause of action to pierce the corporate veil15, Mr. McNeil would also be severely prejudiced. 
Had he been put on notice of that allegation, additional evidence would have been sought, 
(R.155) Additionally Jake McNeil testified that he was working for D&K at the time of 
the accident, and Mr. Lambert questioned him extensively about whether other employees 
were there helping and asked if Jake could remember their names. {Deposition of Jake 
McNeil, attached as addendum 1, p. 22:17-29, p. 26:1-12, 29:1-20.) Finally, the 
Defendant himself noted in an early pleading that Jake had claimed to be working for 
D&K. (R. 124-127.) 
15
 Mr. McNeil and his company could have an identity of interest only if the veil is 
pierced, and the parties are treated as one. An identity of interest is defined as having the 
same legal position and defenses, Penrose f^ 14. If the veil exists, and the parties are 
treated as two separate individuals, then they would not have the same interest or position 
in the litigation. As was indicated in oral argument, Dan McNeil spent three days 
pointing to D&K as the employer of Jake McNeil. Had D&K been on notice and 
represented, it might have disagreed with that assessment. Or it might have offered other 
defenses. (Rec. 1014 p. 50:1-5) 
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additional testimony would have been introduced, and additional arguments would have been 
made, i.e., evidence regarding corporate formalities. Allowing Ms. Ottens to amend after the 
close of evidence to make this argument would have allowed her to try a case that was not 
plead and was not defended. This would have been unduly prejudicial, as the court expressly 
found. (Rec. 1014 p.57) 
2.) Permitting an amendment to bring in D&K under Rule 15(b) after the close 
of evidence would have violated the due process requirements of the United States 
Constitution and the Utah State Constitution. 
In response to the motion to amend, the trial court also considered whether it could 
be proper under Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which may permit an 
amendment to conform to the evidence presented at trial. The court ultimately concluded 
that there was insufficient evidence presented during trial to show that D&K and Dan McNeil 
had an identity of interest or that the corporate veil should be breached16. Thus, if D&K were 
to be brought in, it would be as an entirely separate party. Faced with this situation, the trial 
court rightfully held that allowing Ms. Ottens to add a party, which was not represented, after 
the close of evidence, and to allow a jury to assess damages and allocate fault on that party 
would clearly be in derogation of the guarantees of due process. (Rec. 1014 p. 57:7-13) 
The constitutions of both the United States and the state of Utah contain provisions 
protecting persons from deprivation of rights and property without the due process of the law. 
Utah Const Article I, § 7, U.S. Const, am. 14. As our courts have held, this requires, at a 
16
 For example, there was no evidence of commingling of funds or failure to 
observe corporate formalities presented during trial. 
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minimum, that a party be given notice of the allegations levied against it, and be afforded an 
adequate opportunity to answer and defend. See, Searle v. Searle 2001 UT App 307 J^ 36, 
38 P.3d307, quoting Peraltav. Heights Med. Or., Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 84,108 S.Ct. 896, 899, 
99 L.Ed.2d 75. This would not have occurred in this case if Ms. Ottens had been allowed 
to bring in D&K after evidence had closed. 
Ironically, the very cases cited by Ms. Ottens to justify her attempt at the untimely 
amendment hold that such an action would inevitably run afoul of the minimum requirements 
of procedural due process. In Hernandez v. Baker 2004 UT App 462, 104 P.3d 664, the 
plaintiff obtained a default judgment against Mr. Baker. After default was entered against 
the defendant, the plaintiff moved to amend its pleadings and sought an immediate default 
and amended judgment of a corporate entity owned by Mr. Baker, Performance Auto. The 
trial court obliged, and naturally, Performance Auto sought a review on appeal on both 
jurisdictional and due process grounds. 
In its first argument, Performance claimed that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over 
it because it was never served with a copy of the amended complaint, which it claimed was 
a prerequisite for finding jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals disagreed, in part, with that 
contention. It noted that if there was an identity of interest between the corporate entity and 
Mr. Baker, jurisdiction would have been established by the filing of the amended complaint. 
It further noted that the record showed only that Baker was an owner of the company, which 
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was insufficient to establish an identity. Id., ^ 17. This, of course, is very similar to facts 
present here. 
More significant, however, this Court held that before judgment could be entered 
against the corporate entity it would have to be given an opportunity to respond to the 
allegations in the complaint and present its defenses to the court. Id., f 18. To do otherwise 
would be deprive the corporation of its fundamental rights of procedural due process. Id., ^ 
18. 
In making this decision, the Court relied on a decision issued by the United States 
Supreme Court in Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 120 S.Ct. 1579, 146 L.Ed.2d 
530 (2000), which presented a factual scenario that was almost identical to that present in 
Hernandez. (The roles were reversed. Judgment against the corporate entity was entered, 
and then amended to include the individual owner.) The Supreme Court held that this 
violated fundamental due process rights. It noted that Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure provided for due process by requiring that a party named in an amendment be 
served with a complaint, and that it also be allowed the requisite time to formulate its answer 
and prepare its defense. Id. 466, 1584. And, it further stated that the clock on an added 
party's time to respond does not start running until a new pleading is prepared, filed and 
served. Id., 467, 1584-85. Finally, the court noted that Rule 15, and due process, required a 
more orderly and reliable course. Id., 467, 1584. 
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This is precisely what the trial court recognized when it claimed that Rule 15(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure could not be used to amend the complaint to bring in a new 
party at this point of the trial. (Rec. 1014 pp. 56-58) While judgment may not have been 
entered, the evidence was complete, and Ms. Ottens was requesting that the case immediately 
proceed to that stage. Had the court allowed Ms. Ottens to bring D&K into the suit without 
preparing or serving a complaint, and without allowing D&K the opportunity to answer and 
defend, would have violated the order required by the rule and the dictates of fundamental 
fairness. The court was correct in ruling that the appellant could not add a new party under 
Rule 15(b) at that stage of the proceedings. 
IV) Under Utah law a corporation is a distinct legal person. Defendant's 
assertion that he did not employ Jake McNeil is not an affirmative defense that needs 
to be pleaded under Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Ms. Ottens has also alleged that the trial court erred when it allowed Mr. McNeil to 
assert the he was not vicariously liable for the actions of his son, Jake McNeil, because Jake 
was employed by D&K (rather than by Mr. McNeil himself). In making this argument, the 
appellant first misinterprets, and then misapplies, two different rules of civil procedure, Rule 
8(c), which deals with the necessity of asserting affirmative defenses, and Rule 9(1), which 
deals with the allocation of fault to non-parties. Compounding these difficulties, Ms. Ottens 
also misapplies the doctrine of the "corporate shield," which was not put into issue by any 
pleadings in this case. This, unfortunately, creates additional confusion. 
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A closer examination of the factual background, and a proper understanding of the 
legal principals cited by the appellant, however, reveals that the trial court's decision on this 
issue was well founded. Simply stated, Mr. McNeil did not fail to assert an affirmative 
defense, and was not required to identify D&K in accordance with the provisions of Rule 9 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, In the interests of clarity, and analytical rigor, each of 
the points will be addressed separately. 
1.) The testimony that D&K was Jake's employer is not an affirmative defense 
that needed to be set out in the answer to the complaint. 
One of Ms. Ottens' primary complaints is that the trial court allowed Mr. McNeil to 
argue that he was not Jake's employer (and thereby not vicariously liable for his negligence), 
and to make that point stronger by showing that Jake was, in fact, employed by D&K. Ms. 
Ottens apparently believes that this was an affirmative defense that must be set out in the 
pleadings, or forever waived, under Rule 8(c) of the Utah Civil Procedure, This argument 
falters on two separate grounds. First, it is based upon a fundamental misconception of basic 
principles of corporate law. Second, it is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of the 
affirmative defense. Once these two problems are sorted out, Ms. Ottens' complaints are 
revealed to be insubstantial and unworthy of consideration by this Court. 
At the outset, when assessing the propriety of the trial court's decision on this issue, 
it is necessary to remember that under long established Utah law a corporate entity is vested 
with its own legal existence. Almost six decades ago, our Supreme Court expressly stated 
that "a corporation is a statutory entity which is regarded as having an existence and 
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personality distinct from that of its members of stockholders." Surgical Supply Center v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah, Department of Employment Security, 223 P.2d 593,595,118 
Utah 632 (Utah 1950.) And, even earlier, the Court made clear that a corporation is an 
"artificiaror "juridical" person with an independent existence. Stewart Livestock Co., v. 
Ostler 144 P.2d 276, 285, 105 Utah 529 (Utah 1943). In short, the law considers D&K to 
be one person, and Dan McNeil another. 
It is equally important to understand the nature of an affirmative defense, in order to 
understand why Mr. McNeil was not required to specifically assert that D&K was Jake's 
employer in his answer to the Second Amended Complaint. In Prince v. Bear River Mutual 
Ins., Co., 2002 UT 68, ffi[ 31-33, 56 P.3 524, the Utah Supreme Court explained that an 
affirmative defense is one which employs matters that are outside of, or are extrinsic to, the 
plaintiffs prima facie case, and which, if proven, will defeat the cause of action even if all 
the allegations in the complaint are true17. Clearly, this is not what Mr. McNeil was doing 
when he identified D&K as Jake's employer. 
In paragraph six (6) of her Second Amended Complaint, Ms. Ottens alleged that the 
defendant hired and paid his son, and another unidentified male, to move personal items, 
including the chair at issue, from his rental in Bluffdale to an apartment on 13th East and 
7200 South. (Rec. 430). In response to that allegation, Mr. McNeil admitted that the chair 
belonged to him, but denied everything else, including the fact that he employed and paid 
17
 See also, Black's Law Dictionary 430 (7th ed. 1999) 
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Jake McNeil. (Rec. 422). Even a cursory reading of this answer, then, shows that Mr. 
McNeil was directly controverting an essential element of the plaintiffs prima facie case for 
vicarious liability; he expressly denied that he was Jake's employer. The testimony about 
D&K that was elicited by Ms. Ottens' counsel at trial18 did not change the nature of Mr. 
McNeil's defense in any way. In identifying D&K as the employer (Rec. 1010 p. 27, 1012 
p. 5:2) the witnesses merely provided additional information that was entirely consistent with 
Mr. McNeil's answer to the complaint. In short, they testified that Dan was not the employer, 
but D&K was. Because this undermines an element of plaintiff s prima facie case, it is not 
an affirmative defense, as defined by our Supreme Court in Prince v. Bear River Mutual 
Insurance. 
2.) The corporate shield was not used as an affirmative defense by Mr. McNeil 
in this case. 
At the center of Ms. Ottens' claim that the trial court erred in allowing Mr. McNeil 
to use the corporate shield as a defense (without expressly setting it out in his pleadings) lies 
a fundamental misunderstanding of what the corporate veil is. The doctrine is, in reality, 
merely a logical inference drawn from the fact that corporations and their individual 
shareholders, officers and directors are different juridical persons. Black's Law Dictionary 
describes it as "the legal assumption that the acts of a corporation are not the actions of its 
shareholders, so that shareholders are exempt from liability for the corporation's action." 
Black's Law Dictionary 341 (7th ed. 1999). 
18
 Similar testimony was given in Jake's deposition. 
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Under established Utah law, this means that the veil operates to protect an individual 
shareholder or officer of a corporation from responsibility for corporate torts, if the only basis 
of his alleged liability is her position with the company. This would include liability that is 
predicated on the accusation that the general duties of an officer include oversight of the 
company's operations. Armed Forces Insurance Exchange v. Harrison 2003 UT 14, ff 19, 
21, 70 P.3d 35. It is equally well established, however, that the doctrine does not immunize 
an officer or shareholder from liability, if he or she personally participated in the tortuous act 
in question. Id, f 19, quoting 3 A William Meade Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law 
of Private Corporations §1137, at 209 (rev. ed. 2002) 
Here, Mr. McNeil did not argue that the corporate veil immunized him from liability 
for damages caused by his personal acts, because those acts were taken on behalf of the 
corporation. In fact, when this issue was raised by counsel for Ms. Ottens, the trial court 
made specific inquiries about what was being argued. 
The court stated: 
"Let's ask Mr. Glauser, because he's aching to tell us, are you bringing up the 
shield? 
And counsel for Mr. McNeil replied: 
"No your honor..." and then explained : "Their sixth paragraph said, "Dan 
hired" "Dan paid", okay, are you with me? We deny that Dan didn't hire, and 
Dan didn't pay." 
(Rec. 1014 p. 30:4-18) 
Then later in the argument, counsel clarified again, when he stated: 
41 
" I mean, we're — this defense isn't "We're hiding behind the corporate 
shield", the defense is, "It wasn't me. It was D&K" 
Upon hearing this clarification, the Court stated: 
"Yeah, I think that's the problem. We're confusing someone pointing to 
someone else to using the corporation and saying "I was acting for the 
corporation"." 
(Rec. 1014 p. 31:5-12) 
There is only one way to read this exchange, Mr. McNeil was not attempting to use 
the corporate entity to shield himself from responsibility for acts he personally committed. 
The corporate entity was brought up to bolster the argument that Dan McNeil did not hire or 
pay Jake McNeil, i.e., to counter the claim of vicarious liability that was levied in Ms. 
Ottens' complaint. It may not be said too many times; this line of evidence was intended to 
prove "it wasn't me, it was someone else." As set out above, such an argument attacks the 
plaintiffs prima facie case, and is not, therefore, an affirmative defense that must be set out 
or waived. 
Accordingly, Ms. Ottens' extensive review of cases showing that a corporate officer 
or shareholder might be held liable for a tort under certain circumstances is misplaced. Mr. 
McNeil acknowledges that the personal commission of tortuous acts might lead to liability 
for which the corporate shield is no defense. As shown in the opening sections of this brief, 
however, this was not the case here, and this was not the purpose of identifying D&K as the 
employer of Jake McNeil. 
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3.) Mr. McNeil had no affirmative duty to designate D&K under Rule 9 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Ms. Ottens also asserts that if Mr. McNeil was going to argue that D&K was Jake's 
employer, then he was obligated to designate it as a party to whom fault should be allocated 
under Rule 9(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This argument reflects a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the purpose and requirements of rule, which are best discerned by 
looking at the rule itself. It states, as follows: 
"(1) Allocation of fault 
(1)(1) A party seeking to allocate fault to a non-party under Title 78B, 
Chapter 5, Part 8 shall file: 
(1)(1)(A) a description of the factual and legal basis on which fault can 
be allocated; and 
(1)(1)(B) information known or reasonably available to the party 
identifying the non-party, including name, address, telephone number and 
employer. If the identity of the non-party is unknown, the party shall so state. 
(1)(3) A party may not seek to allocate fault to another except by 
compliance with this rule. 
The plain language of the rule requires that a party make the designation only if it 
intends to ask the finder of fact to allocate some portion of fault to a non-party when making 
its findings. The rule does not create an affirmative obligation to name all persons who might 
have caused a particular accident; rather, it merely provides that you must identify the 
individual, if you wish the finder of fact to allocate fault to that person. 
Here the defendant met that obligation by identifying Jake McNeil, who was operating 
the truck at the time of the accident. And it made that designation in both the answers to the 
initial complaint and to the amended pleading filed years later. (Rec. 65-74, 422-428) 
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Again, it is instructive to note that the rationale for this decision was explored during 
the Motions hearing that was held after the close of evidence. When addressing this issue 
with the trial court, Mr. McNeil's counsel stated that there was no need to allocate fault to 
D&K, because its potential liability, as an employer, was merely derivative. In other words, 
if Jake, who was identified under Rule 9, was allocated 10% of fault for the accident, then 
D&K, as Jake's employer, would be liable for that very same 10%. (Rec. 1014 pp. 54:11-25, 
55:1-14) Since no additional fault would be allocated to D&K, there was no practical reason 
to name them under Rule 9. 
V) Ms. Ottens has failed to marshal the evidence on the evidentiary rulings issued 
by the court in this matter. This is ample reason to deny the requested relief. 
Under long established Utah law, a trial court is vested with broad discretion to 
determine the admissibility of evidence. And absent an abuse of discretion, rulings on 
admissibility will not be disturbed. State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96 f^ 20, 989 P.2d 52. Asset 
out in earlier portions of this brief, where a party alleges that the trial court made an error of 
this sort, it is incumbent it to marshal all of the evidence, on both sides of the question, to 
demonstrate the presence of an abuse. Kealamakia, Inc., v. Kealamakia 2009 UT App 148 
% 10, 213 P.3d 13. Even a cursory review of the brief filed by Ms. Ottens shows that this did 
not occur with respect to the evidentiary issues raised on appeal. She did not order the 
transcripts of the hearings on the motions in limine, her statement of facts makes no reference 
to any portion of the record on appeal, and the argument section of the brief is also devoid 
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of any such reference. Instead, Ms. Ottens merely argues that the court could have made a 
different decision. This is insufficient. 
It is well established that when a party fails to fulfill its obligation to marshal the 
evidence, the appellate courts may simply decline to consider the issues on appeal. Traco 
Steel Erectors v. Comtrol, Inc. 2009 UT 81, ^{ 17-19. It would be proper for the court to 
take this action in this case. 
VI) The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to admit evidence 
that Mr. Dan McNeil was cited for a moving violation and that he paid the ticket. The 
evidence had no probative value to the prosecution of the case. 
While acknowledging that courts traditionally have been loath to permit the 
introduction of evidence of traffic citations or convictions in civil matters, Ms. Ottens has 
argued that the trial court abused its discretion when it declined to do so in this case. She 
argues the evidence, which would generally be precluded by Rule 416 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, was intended to prove that Dan McNeil was the actual driver of the vehicle at the 
time the chair flew out of the pick-up truck. Accordingly, Ms. Ottens believes the evidence 
was permissible because it was not intended to demonstrate negligence on Mr. McNeil's part, 
nor was it intended to impeach his credibility. (These are both impermissible purposes under 
Rule 416.) 
There is a fatal flaw in this reasoning, however, which arises out of the fact that the 
relevant pleadings did not make that allegation, and the question of who was driving was not 
at issue. Ms. Ottens filed her second amended complaint on November 13,2007. (Rec. 429-
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434) Nowhere in that pleading is it alleged that Dan was operating the vehicle at the time of 
the accident, rather the claims were that he negligently secured the chair at issue and that he 
was vicariously liable for the loss because he was the employer of Jake McNeil, who was 
driving the pick-up. (Rec. 429-434). In his answer, Mr. McNeil admitted that Jake was the 
driver (Rec. 422-428). For purposes of trial, therefore, the identity of the driver had been 
established by the pleadings. Accordingly, any evidence that was intended to demonstrate 
that Dan was actually driving the vehicle was simply not relevant, i.e., it did not tend to prove 
a fact of consequence to the determination of the action. Rule 401 Utah Rules of Evidence, 
see also, State v. Johns 615 P.2d 1260, 1263-64 (Utah 1980). 
While the transcript of the hearing on the motion to preclude evidence of the citation 
was not made part of the record on appeal, the trial court's views on this question are clear. 
On the last day of trial, Ms. Ottens argued a similar motion, when she sought to introduce the 
investigating officer's report into evidence. The court refused to permit this, stating that in 
order to allow evidence that Dan was the driver of the vehicle Ms. Ottens would need to 
amend her complaint once again, because the theory of the case presented in pleadings, and 
even on the proposed jury instructions, did not include the claim that Dan was the driver of 
the vehicle. (Record 1014 p. 6:6-8) Rather, it was that Jake was acting on behalf of Dan. 
(Record 1014 p. 11:1-3). Consequently, the court ruled that such evidence did not fit the 
theory of the case. It also held that to amend the complaint to present the new theory, and 
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possibly allow such evidence to be introduced, would be highly prejudicial, unfairly 
prejudicial, and too late. (Record 1014 12:1-20) 
As set out above, this same line of reasoning would apply to the evidence of the 
citation and payment. It does not fit with the theory of case set out in the pleadings, and is 
therefore not probative in any way. And to allow Ms. Ottens to amend her pleadings at such 
a late stage of the case would be improper due to its prejudicial effect19. Daniels v. Gamma 
West Br achy therapy 2009 UT 66 \ 57. In either case, the court was well within its discretion 
to find either that the evidence was irrelevant or that its relevance was outweighed by undue 
prejudice. Rule 401 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Accordingly, this court should not disturb the lower court's ruling. Jensen v. IHC Hospital, 
Inc., 2003 UT 51,1J57, 82 P.3d 1076. 
VII) The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Mr. McNeil to ask 
when Ms. Ottens retained counsel. 
Ms. Ottens also contests a second evidentiary ruling issued by the court, which 
allowed Mr. McNeil to ask when she retained counsel. During the course of the trial, this 
question was raised directly and briefly. Ms. Ottens was asked if she retained him within two 
19
 Ms. Ottens had the opportunity to explore this matter fully in the deposition of 
Mr. McNeil, and he answered questions about the citation and guilty plea at that time. 
This deposition occurred in August 2006. (Rec. 780). More than a year later, she amended 
her complaint and abandoned the claim that Dan was the driver of the vehicle. (Rec. 429-
434) Counsel for the defense objected to Ms. Ottens' attempt at trial to change the theory 
of the case to name Dan as the driver (Recl014 p. 9:5-6), and the trial court agreed that 
it was improper. (Rec. 1014 p. 12:1-20) There is not even the hint that the trial court 
abused its discretion in keeping out this type of evidence. 
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months of the accident, and she answered that she believed so. (Rec. 1011 p. 139:6-11) After 
the question was answered, no further inquiries were made.20 
In papers filed just prior to the start of trial, in particular the appellant's fourth motion 
in limine, Ms. Ottens requested that the trial court preclude the defense from introducing a 
variety of evidence, including any line of questioning, concerning when she retained an 
attorney. The appellant simply argued that such questions were irrelevant under all 
circumstances. (Rec. 764). 
Counsel for the defense pointed out two potential reasons why such evidence might 
be relevant. First, as the Supreme Court recognized in the case of Pennington v. Allstate 973 
P.2d 932 (Utah 1998), early attorney involvement in a case, and possible counsel initiated 
referrals to healthcare providers can support an inference that medical bills and treatment are 
inflated or unreasonable. (Rec. 806). Additionally, the defense anticipated that Ms. Ottens 
would attempt to portray Mr. McNeil as dishonest with respect to the information contained 
in the police report, and assert that she was prejudiced as a result of those actions21. The fact 
that Ms. Ottens retained counsel almost immediately after the accident tends to undermine 
the claim of prejudice. As pointed out in the memorandum filed in connection with that 
motion, early attorney involvement could imply that there was adequate opportunity to clarify 
20
 The same information was contained in a letter written by Ms. Otten's counsel 
dated May 22, 2002, which were part of records introduced at trial. (Exhibits 1: Tab 7, 
006, Rec. 1011 p. 139:22) 
21
 This proved to be the case. (Rec 1014) 
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the statements in the report, and therefore lead to the conclusion that any prejudice suffered 
was the fault of the appellant. (Rec. 806-807) 
Rule 401 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, and the cases that interpret its provisions, 
make clear that the threshold for finding relevance is very low. In State v. Smedley 2003 UT 
App. 79, 67 P.3d 1005, this Court held that evidence with even the slightest probative value 
is relevant. Clearly, this standard is met here. 
A fundamental question in this case, had it gone to a jury, was whether the plaintiff 
treated reasonably and whether the treatment was related to the injuries claimed. Since the 
Supreme Court has recognized that early attorney involvement may imply, under the right 
circumstances, that the treatment was not reasonable, then the simple question of when one 
retained an attorney is relevant. If the evidence could be misused in argument at a later time, 
as Ms. Ottens seems to suggest might happen (Rec. 828), then a timely objection could be 
made. This does not mean, however, that the inquiry should not be made. 
Similarly, the question was directly relevant to the question of prejudice asserted by 
counsel at trial. If one claims that one is deceived, the amount of time one had professional 
help to clear up disputed facts is certainly relevant to that issue. Again, the question about 
when counsel was retained helps clarify that issue. 
In both cases, the evidence was relevant under the terms of Rule 401 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence, and in neither case was it used in the manner suggested by Ms. Ottens in 
49 
her pretrial motions. Simply put, the probative value outweighed the potential for prejudice, 
and therefore the evidence was admissible under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, 
Conclusion 
For the reasons set out above, this court should uphold the directed verdict entered in 
favor of Dan McNeil. It should also uphold the ruling that denied the plaintiff the right to 
amend its complaint to add Jake McNeil as a party after the statute of limitation had run. It 
should also uphold the denial of the motions to amend the complaint to add D&K as a party, 
and to change its theory of liability to allege that Dan McNeil was the driver of the vehicle. 
These motions were made after the close of evidence and were therefore untimely. Finally, 
the court should uphold the evidentiary rulings made, as the court was clearly within its rights 
to determine what evidence was presented at trial. 
DATED this 28th day of December, 2009. 
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C. 
RICMRD K. Qy&fk^ 
MICHAEL W. d & ^ f T 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 




NICKOLAS COLEMAN and DAN 
McNEIL, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 050911123 
Judge Frederick 
DEPOSITION OF: JACOB McNEIL 
August 10, 2006 
10:13 a.m. 
Location: 
Arrow Legal Solutions Group 
266 East 7200 South 
Midvale, Utah 
Reporter: Jeanette Lund, CSR, RPR, and 
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah 
CD ENCLOSED 
Q A REPORTING, INC 
Jacob McNeil * August 10, 2006 
Q Do you recall on the day if your father was at 
all supervising the loading of the -- his possessions? 
A Yes, that's pretty much all he was doing. 
Q And do you recall if he, your sister -- or 
your half sister, Kaedee, or Kim McNeil helped load the 
pickup truck that you drove? 
A I would imagine everybody probably helped. I 
don't know if they directly loaded that or -- we were 
all helping. 
Q Do you know if your father owned the home at 
Pony Express, Bluffdale? 
A I believe he rented or leased. I'm not 
positive. 
Q Do you know if he had -- and you may not --
any homeowner's or rental insurance? 
A I'm not sure. 
Q And you indicated that this was a workday that 
he asked you and the other employees to help work -- to 
load his home? 
A Yes. 
Q And did he pay you from company funds for 
doing that that day? 
A Yes, I believe so. 
Q And you may not know any of this, but I'll ask 
anyway. Do you know if he treated these employees as 
Page 22 
O & A Reporting 
Jacob McNeil * August 10, 2006 
A I didn't help finish. I just helped during 
the eight-hour period that I was there for work and then 
that was it, 
Q So did you work a whole eight hours helping 
the move? 
A Honestly, I can't say it was an exact eight, 
but as far as he wanted our help, then I helped. When 
he said that you guys are done, then we were done. 
Q How were you paid for that day? 
A I believe it was just on our paychecks. 
Q So you didn't receive, like, a separate check 
for that particular day? 
A No, no. 
Q I don't think I have any more questions. Let 
me just look over my notes. 





Yes, it means a lot to me. 
Who is Kirk? 
Kirk is a contractor, a building contractor 
who we used to do work for. 
Q Do you know if he was working for your father 
as a contractor back during the March 29th, 2002 time 
frame? 
A We would have been working for him. We're 
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Jacob McNeil * August 10, 2006 
A No. 
Q Were you able to get any of the money back? 
A Nope. 
Q Did you ask your father about that situation? 
A Yes, I asked him and Kirk. 
Q Nothing became of it, I assume? 
A Nope. 
Q At the time that this accident occurred, how 
long had you had that truck? 
A It was a short period of time. Maybe six 
months. 
Q And how long afterward did you have the truck 
until he came and got it? 
A That's until he came and got it, so I didnft 
have it any time after that. He came and got it at 
night. I was in bed. 
Q What I mean is after March 29th, 2002, how 
long did you have the truck? 
I don't know. I don't recall. 
Was it a couple months or several years? 





Q Do you remember any of the -- I already asked 
you if you remembered the names of any of the employees 
at that time that were helping move. Just in general, 
n 
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emember the names of any of the employees that 
or D&K around the winter, spring of 2002? 
No, not that I can tell you, you know, 
and accurately. 
Did you ever have any friends that worked for 
at I mean by friends is people that you either 






















friendship or a relationship with --
I have before, yes. 
And what are the names of those friends? 
My friend Daniel Garamendi worked there for a 
hile. 
Do you remember during what period of time? 
I don't. 
Is it possible he worked during the winter and 
f 2002? 
I don't know. 
Do you know how he can be reached? 
I don't. 
Do you know how to spell Garamendi? 
I don't. G-A-R-A -- I don't know. It's a 
• 
Do you know the name of his parents? 
I don't. 
Do you know the name of any of his brothers, 
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DAN McNIEL 
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DEPOSITION OF: DAN McNEIL 
August 10, 2006 
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Location: 
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Notary Public in and for the State of Utah 
CD ENCLOSED 
INC 
1 R 7 9 <^vi*-K Mo, ™ Q ^ Q „ U T „1 ^ /~V 
Dan McNeil * August 10, 2006 
there on the side of the road. 
Q So you just saw it and you didn't stop, 
correct? 
A Huh-uh, I was -- no. No. Sorry. 
Q And then when you called Jake, were you still 
traveling? 
A Oh, yes. 
Q And then did you continue on until you got to 
the apartment on 13th? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you at any time talk to any police 
officers? 
A I don't ever recall talking to a police 
officer. 
Q Did you ever retrieve the chair? 
A No. The chair never got back with me, no. 
Q What caused you to surmise when you saw the 
chair, or conclude that it was one of yours? 
A Because my chairs are very distinct. They are 
black with a white seat on them. 
Q And is that what you saw when you drove past 
this chair? 
A Yes. 
Q I gather based upon your testimony, then, you 
ended up with just three chairs and you didn't ever 
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at sort of during a normal workday and that, in 
you were paying him to help move by, you know, 
im a regular paycheck as you would for any other 













Does that sound familiar? 
I don't know. I don't remember what day it 
Yeah. He probably remembers better because he 
one getting the money. 
Probably. I don't know. To be really honest 
, I couldn't tell you if he was on the payroll 
So if he has a firm recollection of that, 











on the b 
Q 
Yes, I would have to go with what he says 
I can't remember the day, let alone... 
Why didn't you -- when you saw your chair on 
of the freeway, why didn't you go back and get 
Well, when you're going 50 miles an hour or 55 
hour down the freeway and you glance and you 
thing, you don't go like, Oop, I've got to stomp 
rakes right here. 
Why not wheel off on the next exit and go 
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NICKOLAS COLEMAN, an ; 
individual and DAN McNElL, 
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Utah, before Cathy Gallegos, Certified Court Reporter and 
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, pursuant to 
Notice. 
* * * * 
in"-
j^port^is 
1 A At the very top, where it has the accident 
2 location, date of the accident, the time, direction of 
3 travel. Then everything below that, that's not my 
4 handwriting. 
5 Q So where it says "D & K Finish Carpentry," 
6 and "Driver's name: Dan McNeil," you don't recognize that 
7 handwriting? 
8 A No. That's not my handwriting. 
9 Q Typically when these accident information 
10 forms are filled out, who puts the information there? 
11 A Specifically, it would be the owner of that 
12 vehicle, the driver. In cases where somebody is having 
13 medical treatment, then we would gather that information, 
14 I would fill it out myself. In this case, the top portion 
15 looks likes my handwriting. The remainder is not my 
16 handwriting. 
17 Q If you could go back to the accident 
18 information form where it has the driver's name as "Jen 
19 Ottens" and take a look at that. 
2 0 A Sure. One moment. I am turning there. 
21 Q Keep your thumb on the Dan McNeil, because I 
22 am going to go back to that. 
23 A Okay. I am there at that page. 

























that Dan McNeil was the c 
chair? 
Iriver of the vehicle with the 
A 1 thought quite a lot about this. From my 
memory, I remember being 
vehicle that dropped the 
correctly, that is how I 
from a license plate. 
Q Do you know 
spoke with Dan McNeil? 
A I did. But 
over the phone. I don't 
spoken to him directly. 
given a license plates of the 
chair. If my memory serves me 
got Dan McNeil's name -- would be 
if you or any other officer ever 
if I remember correctly, it was | 
remember. I may or may not have 
It is really weird. I don't have 
a specific memory of actually standing in front of him. I 
did at one point have a telephone conversation with him. 
Q Do you recall whether or not Dan McNeil 
communicated that he was the driver of the vehicle? 
A No, I don't specifically remember him saying 
that. The only thing I remember about the conversation, 
if you want me to tell you that, I will, or wait for the 
question. 
Q Go ahead and tell me what you remember. 
A The specific memory I have of the 
conversation with -- I believe it would have been Dan 
McNeil was telling me that he was moving and moving stuff 
1 that storage, or wherevei the stuff was being dropped off, 
2 that he was missing a chair when he got there. 
3 Q Anything else? 
4 A No, but that's ]ust the one thing that sticks 
5 m my mind, because I felt like I had the correct person 
6 at that point m time. 
7 Q And based upon your earlier testimony again, 
8 you don't know if the information filled out on the Utah 
9 Highway Patrol Accident Information Form was filled out by 
10 Dan McNeil or any other individual? 
11 A No. I don't remember. I remember having 
12 gone to the address down m the south end of the valley 
13 several times. Couldn't get m contact with him, so I 
14 left a card. One of the other experienced troopers gave 
15 that suggestion to me to leave a caid on their vehicle 
16 requesting contact. Then I was contacted by that 
17 individual. I can't remember if I sent the form to him m 
18 the mail or if I actually went down and handed it to him. 
19 I don't have a specific memory of that. 
20 Q Do you know or do you recall any of the 
21 demeanor of any of the persons in the accident7 And what 
22 I mean by "demeanor" is nervous, angry, confused, upset, 
23 dazed; any of those physical signs that you noticed on any 
24 of the participants in the accident? 
2 5 A No, I don't. 
*1 do you ever recall anyone bringing it to your attention 
2 that a son of Dan McNeil had any involvement or anything 
3 to do with the moving of that chair? 
4 A No, I don't. 
5 Q Do you ever recall Mr. McNeil or it being 
6 brought to your attention that Mr. McNeil, at least as far 
7 J as his representations to you, or the highway patrol, that 
he was the driver of the vehicle? What I mean by "Mr." is 
Dan McNeil as noted on the accident information form. 
10 I A Do I remember he represented that he was the 
LI driver in the situation? 
L2 Q Correct. 
3 A I don't have a specific memory of that. Like 
4 I said, I would just have to go off the police report, 
5 J showing that the statement that I received showed that Dan 
McNeil was the driver under the driver information, but I 
don't remember him specifically telling me, "Yes, 1 was 
the driver of the vehicle." 
9 I MR. LAMBERT: I don't have anything further. 
0 J There may be a follow-up. 
FURTHER EXAMINATION 
BY MR. WRIGHT: 
i I Q I have a few follow-ups. My name is Michael 
1 Wright again. Let me ask you briefly two things because I 
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showing jurisdiction to render it A denial of jurisdiction shall be made specifically and with particularity and 
when so made the party pleading the judgment or decision shall establish on the trial all controverted jurisdic-
tional facts 
(f) Time and place. For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of a pleading, averments of time and place are 
material and shall be considered like all other averments of material matter 
(g) Special damage. When items of special damage are claimed, they shall be specifically stated 
(h) Statute of limitations. In pleading the statute of limitations it is not necessary to state the facts showing the 
defense but it may be alleged generally that the cause of action is barred by the provisions of the statute relied 
on, referring to or describing such statute specifically and definitely by section number, subsection designation, 
if any, or otherwise designating the provision relied upon sufficiently clearly to identify it If such allegation is 
controverted, the party pleading the statute must establish, on the trial, the facts showing that the cause of action 
is so barred 
(i) Private statutes; ordinances. In pleading a private statute of this state, or an ordinance of any political sub-
division thereof, or a right derived from such statute or ordinance, it is sufficient to refer to such statute or ordin-
ance by its title and the day of its passage or by its section number or other designation in any official publica-
tion of the statutes or ordinances The court shall thereupon take judicial notice thereof 
(j) Libel and slander. 
(j)(l) Pleading defamatory matte? It is not necessary in an action for libel or slander to set forth any intrinsic 
facts showing the application to the plaintiff of the defamatory matter out of which the action arose, but it is suf-
ficient to state generally that the same was published or spoken concerning the plaintiff If such allegation is 
controverted, the party alleging such defamatory matter must establish, on the trial, that it was so published or 
spoken 
(f)(2) Pleading defense In his answer to an action for libel or slander, the defendant may allege both the truth of 
the matter charged as defamatory and any mitigating circumstances to reduce the amount of damages, and, 
whether he proves the justification or not, he may give in evidence the mitigating circumstances 
(k) Renew judgment. A complaint alleging failure to pay a judgment shall describe the judgment with particu-
larity or attach a copy of the judgment to the complaint 
(1) Allocation of fault. 
(1)(1) A party seeking to allocate fault to a non-party under Title 78B, Chapter 5, Part 8 shall file 
(!)(!)(A) a description of the factual and legal basis on which fault can be allocated, and 
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(1)(1)(B) information known or reasonably available to the party identifying the non-party, including name, ad-
dress, telephone number and employer. If the identity of the non-party is unknown, the party shall so state. 
(1)(2) The information specified in subsection (1)(1) must be included in the party's responsive pleading if then 
known or must be included in a supplemental notice filed within a reasonable time after the party discovers the 
factual and legal basis on which fault can be allocated but no later than the deadline specified in the discovery 
plan under Rule 26(f). The court, upon motion and for good cause shown, may permit a party to file the informa-
tion specified in subsection (1)(1) after the expiration of any period permitted by this rule, but in no event later 
than 90 days before trial. 
(1)(3) A party may not seek to allocate fault to another except by compliance with this rule. 
CREDIT(S) 
[Amended effective November 1, 2003; May 2, 2005; November 1, 2008.] 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Joinder of defendants, allocation of fault to non-party, description of factual and legal basis on which fault 
can be allocated and information identifying non-party, see § 78B-5-821. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Damages € ^ > 142. 
Limitation of Actions € ^ 176 to 192. 
Pleading € = > 46, 18,59. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 302k46; 302kl8; 302k59; 115kl42; 241kl76 to 241kl92. 
C.J.S. Damages §§ 225 to 228. 
C.J.S. Limitations of Actions §§ 269 to 285, 287 to 290. 
C.J.S. Pleading §§ 70 to 71, 96, 136 to 138, 162, 165. 
RESEARCH REFERENCES 
Forms 
Am. Jur. PL & Pr. Forms Labor and Labor Relations § 3, Procedural Rules References. 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
Standing, 
Challenging constitutionality of legislation, see Diamond v. Charles, U.S.111.1986, 106 S Ct. 1697, 476 
U.S. 54,90 L.Ed.2d 48. 
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*I3 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Rets & Aiinos) 
*g Pait ill Pleadings, Motions, and Orders 
_• RULE 15. AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive 
pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not 
been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served Otherwise a 
party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party, and leave shall 
be freely gi\ en when justice so requires A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading within the time 
remaining for response to the original pleading or withm 10 days after service of the amended pleading, 
whichever period may be the longer, unless the court otheiw lse orders 
(b) Amendments to Conform to the Evidence. When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by express or 
implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings 
Such amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise 
these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment, but failure so to amend 
does not affect the result of the trial of these issues If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is 
not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended when the present-
ation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that 
the admission of such evidence would prejudice him m maintaining his action or defense upon the merits The 
court shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence 
(c) Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out 
of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the 
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading 
(d) Supplemental Pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such 
terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events 
vvhich have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented Permission may be granted even 
though the original pleading is defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense If the court deems it ad 
visable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall so order, specifying the time therefor 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Limitation of Actions € ^ > 127, 124 
Parties € ^ 54, 62 
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*S Utah Rules of Evidence (Rcfs & Annos) 
*§ Article IV. Relevancy and Its Limits 
-• RULE 401. DEFINITION OF "RELEVANT EVIDENCE" 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of con-
sequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evid-
ence. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and is comparable in substance to Rule 1(2), Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971), but the former rule defined relevant evidence as that having a tendency to prove or disprove the exist-
ence of any "material fact." Avoiding the use of the term "material fact" accords with the application given to 
former Rule 1(2) by the Utah Supreme Court. State v. Peterson, 560 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977). 
LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES 
United States v. Downing: Novel Scientific Evidence and the Rejection of Frye. Walden, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 839 
(1986). 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
Criminal Law <£x? 338. 
Evidence C ^ 99. 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 110k338; 157k99. 
C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 710, 730. 
C.J.S. Evidence §§ 2 to 5, 197 to 199, 204, 206. 
RESEARCH REFERENCES 
Forms 
Am. Jur. PI. & Pi. Forms Evidence § 19, Procedural Rules References. 
Treatises and Practice Aids 
Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 25:46, Utah. 
NOTES OF DECISIONS 
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^§ Utah Rules of Evidence (Rcfs & Annos) 
*§ Article IV. Relevancy and Its Limits 
-• RULE 403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF PREJUDICE, 
CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively comparable to Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971) except that "surprise" is not included as a basis for exclusion of relevant evidence. The change in lan-
guage is not one of substance, since "surprise" would be within the concept of "unfair prejudice" as contained in 
Rule 403. See also Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule 403 indicating that a continuance in most in-
stances would be a more appropriate method of dealing with "surprise." See also Smith v. Esielle. 445 F.Supp. 
647 (N.D.Tex. 1977) (surprise use of psychiatric testimony m capital case ruled prejudicial and violation of due 
process). See the following Utah cases to the same effect Terry v. Ziom Coop Mercantile Inst, 605 P.2d 314 
(Utah 1979); State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260 (Utah 1980), Rvher v Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982). 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Pretrial disclosure of evidence, see Rules Civ. P r o c Rule 26. 
LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES 
Chapman v. State, Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony-An Issue of Admissibility or Credibility? Callister, 1983 
UtahL. Rev. 381 (1983). 
Enhancing Penalties by Admitting "Bad Character" Evidence During the Guilt Phase of Criminal Trials-State v. 
Bishop. Prince, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 1013 (1989). 
Evidence of Repeated Acts of Rape and Child Molestation: Reforming Utah Law to Permit the Propensity Infer-
ence. Cassell and Slrassberg, 1998 Utah L Rev. 145 (1998). 
State v Runmasch: Utah's Threshold Admissibility Standard for Child Sexual Abuse Profile Evidence. Mundt-
Larsh, 1990 Utah L. Rev. 641 (1990). 
United States v. Downing: Novel Scientific Evidence and the Rejection of Frye . Walden, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 839 
(1986). 
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* ! Utah Rules of Evidence (Rcfs & Annos) 
*§j Article IV. Relevancy and Its Limits 
_• RULE 416. VIOLATION OF TRAFFIC CODE NOT ADMISSIBLE 
Evidence that a person was convicted under a provision of Utah Code Annotated Title 41, Chapter 6a, of an in-
fraction or class C misdemeanor is not admissible on the issue of whether the person acted negligently or other-
wise wrongly, or to impeach the person's testimony on those issues. 
CREDIT(S) 
[Adopted effective March 1, 2006.] 
Rules of Evid., Rule 416, UT R REV Rule 416 
Current with amendments received through October 1, 2009. 
Copr (c) 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to ong. U.S. govt. 
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